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The authors examine the direct and moderating effects of firm-specific managerial experience on 
the relationship between social capital and performance. Using data from Ghana, the findings 
show that social capital from bureaucratic officials and community leaders, as well as firm-
specific managerial experience, have a positive influence on performance, while social capital 
from politicians has a negative influence on firm performance. Furthermore, firm-specific 
managerial experience positively moderates the relationship between (a) social capital from 
politicians and performance, and (b) social capital from community leaders and performance. 
Therefore, firm-specific managerial experience attenuates the detrimental effects of social capital 
from politicians on performance. The findings contribute to knowledge in the social capital and 
resource-based view literature. 
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The importance of social capital in management research in recent years cannot be 
overemphasized. Although there are significant differences among researchers about the 
definition of social capital, it is generally considered as a valuable resource that is embedded in a 
network of social relationships (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Granovetter, 1992). Social capital 
developed through social networking relationships and ties has, therefore, been regarded as one 
of the most intangible and least fungible resources that could be used to create competitive 
advantage in a firm (Steier, 2001). Thus, the social capital created through the development and 
exploitation of social networking relationships with external entities establishes the avenues for 
the exchange of valuable information, resources, and knowledge for firms (e.g., Adler & 
Kwon, 2002; Burt, 1997; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000). 
 
Despite the growing literature examining the performance implications of the social capital 
developed from social networking relationships in transition economies (e.g., Acquaah, 2007; 
Acquaah & Eshun, 2010; Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2008; Peng & Luo, 2000), very few have 
investigated how the social capital–performance relationship is contingent on the endowment 
and utilization of a firm's internal resources and capabilities. Moreover, most of these studies 
have focused on resources and capabilities such as financial resources and technological 
capabilities and managers' functional experiences (e.g., Li et al., 2008; Li & Zhang, 2007). 
Notwithstanding the utility of firm-specific managerial experiential knowledge in fostering 
learning, creation of social relationships, and leveraging the advantage from such relationships, 
no empirical study has explored how firm-specific managerial experience (FSME) moderates the 
relationship between social capital and firm performance. It has been suggested that the choice of 
external entities with which firms develop social networking relationships to create external 
social capital and the deployment and leveraging of the resources and capabilities obtained from 
the social networking relationships depends on the firm-specific experiential knowledge of top 
managers (Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Bretton-Miller, 2009; Penrose, 1995). However, there has 
been relatively little attention devoted to how the use and benefits from external social capital is 
contingent on FSME in creating value for firms (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). 
 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the effect of the interaction between social capital 
and FSME on firm performance using data from a transition economy in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA)—Ghana. We focus on FSME because it serves as a source of critical managerial 
capabilities, as it signals the possession of an intimate and tacit knowledge of a firm's resources 
and capabilities that enable the assessment of viable opportunities available to the firm. 
Transition economies in SSA have historically insulated domestic firms from global and 
sometimes domestic competition. However, these countries are currently transforming their 
economies from state-controlled to free market capitalist systems. Governments in most of these 
SSA economies have been implementing economic transformation policies for almost three 
decades (e.g., dismantled protectionist barriers, adopted free trade policies, created market-
friendly institutions, and integrated these economies into the global economy), thus intensifying 
domestic market competition, increasing uncertainty, and creating greater turbulence in the 
domestic business environment. However, the impact of the economic transformation policies 
have been slow to take hold; therefore, SSA economies are still characterized by high levels of 
market imperfections and “institutional voids”—the absence of market-supporting institutions, 
specialized intermediaries, contract-enforcing mechanisms, and efficient transportation and 
communications networks (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). 
 
As a result of these institutional voids, firms lack key raw materials, easy access to capital at a 
reasonable cost, and effective managerial and technical capabilities. These resources and 
capabilities deficiency, institutional voids, and structural obstacles in SSA economies create 
potential dilemma in the strategic organization of business activities. One way of acquiring the 
necessary resources and capabilities to navigate the complex and uncertain institutional and 
business environment in SSA is through the external social capital from networking relationships 
and ties (Acquaah, 2007; Dubini & Aldrich, 1991). We argue that the resources and capabilities 
obtained from external social capital could be used by firms in SSA to create competitive 
advantage. Moreover, FSME is crucial in leveraging and allocating these resources and 
capabilities efficiently and effectively to create value for the firms. 
 
This study contributes to the growing literature on social capital and the resource-based view of 
the firm in transition economies by assessing the extent to which the effect of social capital on 
firm performance is dependent on FSME. Therefore, the study informs the debate on the value of 
social capital as FSME become more heterogeneous. In the process, this study examines how the 
utilization of managers' external social capital and the leveraging of FSME influence firm 
performance. By using data over two time periods, this is one of the few studies to examine the 
relationship between social capital, FSME, and their interaction on performance in a transition 
economy. 
 
GHANA: THE ECONOMIC, SOCIOCULTURAL, AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Ghana is a relatively small SSA country located on the West African coast and was the first in 
SSA to gain independence from colonial rule (from Great Britain) in 1957. The U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency's (CIA) The World Factbook (2010) estimates that in 2009, Ghana had a 
population of about 24.3 million, a GDP of US$15.51 billion, a real GDP growth rate of 3.5%, a 
per capita GDP of US$1500.00, and an inflation rate of 19.3%. Although Ghana is considered 
one of the fastest growing economies in Africa (Blankson, Owusu-Frempong, & Mbah, 2004), 
the country is highly dependent on foreign aid and assistance. 
 
Ghana's implementation of free-market economic reforms through the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank-led structural adjustment programs (SAPs) have nurtured an 
economy that is relatively open (Mmieh & Owusu-Frimpong, 2009), but real institutional change 
and business infrastructure development have been slow because of corruption and bureaucratic 
procedures and processes. Obtaining the necessary resources through arms-length transactions 
for organizing business activities in Ghana is therefore challenging. 
 
Ghana has had a stable political climate with a constitutional democratic government since 1992, 
but corruption is still pervasive because of the presence of red tape and regulatory meddling in 
the economic and business environment by politicians and bureaucratic officials. The political 
climate in Ghana is further characterized by what could be called the “winner-takes-all” 
syndrome, where the supporters of the political party in power are the primary beneficiaries of 
most opportunities and resource allocation by the government (Acquaah & Eshun, 2010). Thus, 
the institutional framework for executing and enforcing the laws facilitating the exchange of 
resources is weak and favors the supporters and sympathizers of the political party in power. 
 
Ghana is a collectivistic society that is characterized by strong interpersonal and social 
relationships. Traditional Ghanaian society is organized around social systems (kinship groups 
and collectivist communities), in which the clan and extended family play an indispensable role 
in creating the norms, values, and behavioral conduct acceptable to the society. Individuals who 
belong to a particular social system therefore exhibit strong loyalty to that social organization 
and its traditional political and sociocultural authority (Codjoe, 2003). Interpersonal and social 
interactions, connections, and relationships among members in the social system are highly 
cherished. Individuals in the social system are bound together through various social benefits and 
obligations and therefore are committed to one another by norms of reciprocity and equity 
(Cudjoe, 2003). 
 
Because the institutional framework for implementing and enforcing the laws and regulations 
governing conduct of arms-length business transactions is weak, managers in Ghana depend on 
the interpersonal and social relationships with individuals who have power and authority to help 
them obtain the resources and capabilities for their businesses (e.g., Kuada & Buame, 2000). 
Interpersonal and social connections have thus become vital for obtaining resources in order to 
circumvent the often inefficient and ineffective implementation and enforcement of the formal 
bureaucratic arms-length rules and regulations governing business activities. 
 




Social capital theory postulates that social networking relationships provide value to actors (e.g., 
individuals, organizations, or communities) by allowing them to tap into the resources embedded 
in such relationships for their benefit (Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2001). Top managers in 
organizations develop social capital through a variety of personal, social, and economic 
relationships with their constituencies. These include personal and social networking with 
suppliers, customers, competitors, trade associations, government political and bureaucratic 
institutions, and community organizations and institutions. In this study, we focus on the social 
capital that is developed by a firm's top management through personal and social networking 
relationships with leaders in government political and bureaucratic institutions, and in 
communities. The social capital developed through these networking relationships function as 
conduits for the transmission of information, resources, and opportunities that could be leveraged 
to a firm's advantage (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000). Previous studies in transition economies have 
demonstrated that because of the high levels of market imperfections and lack of “institutional 
voids” (Khanna & Palepu, 1997), top managers develop networking relationships with 
politicians, government bureaucratic leaders, and community leaders to obtain the resources for 
the strategic organization of their activities leading to improved performance (e.g., 
Acquaah, 2007; Li & Zhang, 2007; Peng & Luo, 2000). 
 
Recently, researchers have shown that while social capital provides benefit to organizations, it 
can also hinder their progress by acting as constraints on an organization's activities and thus its 
performance: the so called “dark side” of social capital (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Portes & 
Sensenbrenner, 1993). This phenomenon is pronounced when firms engage in networking 
relationships with government political officials in transition economies (Li, Zhou, & 
Shao, 2009; Siegel, 2007). Siegel (2007) has shown that in South Korea, managerial ties with 
political officials decreases an organization's chances of forming strategic international alliances 
when the political regime changes. Li et al. (2009) also found that foreign firms benefit from ties 
with the top managers of other firms in China but suffer from ties with political leaders and 
officials. Thus, external social capital could be beneficial as well as detrimental to organizations 
depending on the external constituents with whom the networking relationships are developed. 
 
In the Ghanaian business environment, external social capital from politicians and bureaucrats 
can provide firms with access to financial resources (from government-controlled financial 
institutions), offer opportunities by awarding government projects and contracts, certify products 
as meeting government standards, and provide information about new and impending regulations 
that may affect their strategic activities (Acquaah, 2007; Acquaah & Eshun, 2010). At the same 
time, networking with politicians can be costly and can hinder performance because of the 
excessive demands they place on firms for favors in the areas of employment for family 
members who may not be qualified and for monetary contributions to political campaigns and 
political parties. External social capital from community leaders facilitates the firm's legitimacy 
and promotes access to resources and information as the community leaders endorse the 
organization and its activities in their communities. This may enable the organization to obtain 
access to resources such as sources of financial resources, favorable leases to land for 
construction or agricultural purposes, new market segments or new customers, and/or 
technological know-how (Acquaah, 2007; Kuada, 2009; Kuada & Buame, 2000). 
 
Thus firms that are more proactive and assertive in creating external social capital would be able 
to acquire the resources, information, and knowledge needed to deal with uncertainty in the 
business environment and to improve performance. Such external social capital (from politicians, 
government bureaucrats, and community leaders) is especially important to firms in SSA as they 
act as the means of obtaining the deficient resources, information, and opportunities that could be 
used to the firms' advantage. Firms will therefore experience more performance benefits from the 
development and exploitation of higher levels of social capital from community leaders and 
bureaucratic officials. However, the benefits that firms obtain from the social capital from 
politicians will be tempered with the costs of maintaining that relationship such that its effect on 
performance will be neutralized. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Higher levels of social capital from politicians will not influence firm 
performance. 
 
Hypotheses 1b and 1c: Higher levels of social capital from (b) bureaucratic officials and 
(c) community leaders will have a positive influence on firm performance. 
 
Firm-Specific Managerial Experience 
 
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm conceives the firm as a bundle of idiosyncratic 
resources embedded in its various organizational units (Penrose, 1995; Wernerfelt, 1984). The 
RBV postulates that firms in less than perfectly competitive markets are heterogeneous in terms 
of their resources and capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984). Thus, firms that are able to generate 
competitive advantage and earn superior performance must possess resources and capabilities 
that are valuable, rare, difficult to imitate, imperfectly substitutable, and organized to be 
exploited (Barney, 1991). The capabilities of a firm's top management team exhibit these 
characteristics. A firm's top management capabilities refer to the possession of knowledge, skills, 
and experience that enable the managers to handle a difficult and complex task and to make 
informed resource allocation decisions unique to a firm in a particular industry (Acquaah & 
Chi, 2007). The bundles of FSMEs in a firm can epitomize the skills, expertise, and knowledge 
as well as the competencies of top managers (Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Harris & Helfat, 1997; 
Kor, 2003). 
 
Top managers with a high level of firm-specific experience possess an intimate knowledge of the 
firm's idiosyncratic resources, capabilities, and commitments that provide them with tacit know-
how and expertise of the firm's strategic issues. Thus, FSME involves the accumulation of tacit 
knowledge of that firm's resources and capabilities that could be leveraged to allocate resources 
efficiently and effectively to deal with its strategic initiatives and for value creation. For instance, 
it is argued that top managers' capabilities in the form of firm-specific knowledge and experience 
with a firm's products or services, human resource availability, manufacturing capability, 
technology, etc., may provide the skills necessary to effectively and efficiently manage and 
deploy those resources and capabilities to create competitive advantage and superior 
performance (Kor, 2003). 
 
Moreover, a high level of FSME also creates a high level of the focal firm's industry-level 
knowledge and experience. This FSME and its subsequent industry-level experience generates a 
detailed knowledge and understanding of the opportunities, threats, competitive conditions, 
technological developments, and regulations that may be used to the advantage of a specific firm 
(Kor & Misangyi, 2008). The FSME could further lead to the detection of emerging 
opportunities, customer preferences, and new trends that a firm may need to exploit in its 
industry to develop competitive advantage and create value for the firm. As stated by Kor and 
Misangyi (2008, p. 1346), “Experiential knowledge of customer preferences and competitors' 
commitments and competencies is instrumental to product positioning and in managing 
competitive dynamics.” 
 
The FSME involves tacit knowledge of firm-specific capabilities such as employee skills, 
financial resources, organizational routines, and relationships with suppliers and buyers that are 
difficult to imitate (Kor & Mahoney, 2005) and industry-specific knowledge such as competitors, 
customers, market conditions, and technology. Thus, the RBV suggests that there is an important 
causal relationship between FSME and the identification, development, and exploitation of a 
firm's endowment of superior resources and capabilities to create sustainable competitive 
advantage. This is precisely the assertion by Collis (1994), who states that firms with superior 
managerial capabilities have the ability to utilize them effectively and efficiently for the 
organization of strategic activities through the manufacturing, offering, and delivery of products 
and services that meet customer needs. Because FSME is rooted in firm-specific knowledge and 
experiences and enables an intimate knowledge and understanding of the focal firm's industry, 
we expect that firm with top managers who exhibit high levels of firm-specific experiential 
knowledge will be able to create competitive advantage in the marketplace and thus obtain 
superior performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of firm-specific managerial experience will have a positive 
influence on firm performance. 
 
Moderating Effect of Firm-Specific Managerial Experience 
 
External social capital enables firms to obtain the resources and capabilities that are used to 
organize strategic activities and create value. But, according to the RBV, firms earn sustainable 
competitive advantage and superior performance not just because of the endowment of resources 
and capabilities they possess but also because of their effective management of those resources 
and capabilities (Mahoney, 1995). Penrose (1995, p. 5) asserts, “It is shown not only that the 
resources with which a particular firm is accustomed to working with will shape the productive 
services its management is capable of rendering (where management is defined in the broadest 
sense), but also that the experience of management will affect productive services that all its 
other resources are capable of rendering” [our emphasis]. Barney (1991) and Castanias and 
Helfat (1991) have argued precisely that the potential for firm resources and capabilities to create 
competitive advantage and superior performance depends on the effectiveness with which top 
managers use their experiential knowledge to manage and deploy those resources and 
capabilities. Therefore, we argue that the value of the resources and capabilities obtained through 
external social capital is contingent on FSME. 
 
FSME leads to the development of detailed knowledge of the firm, its problems and strategic 
initiatives (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). Therefore, firms with extensive FSME will make 
effective and efficient use of the resources that are derived from external social capital. 
Managers with extensive FSME have accumulated tacit knowledge of their firms' organizational 
routines, physical and human resources, and capabilities so they would be able to properly match 
those resources and capabilities to minimize threats and exploit opportunities in the firm's 
external environment. 
 
Because firms possess different resources and capabilities, they also differ in their resources and 
capabilities needs for the strategic organization of their activities (Newbert, 2007). FSME is 
therefore imperative in effectively shaping the future direction of a firm (Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009). Firms with extensive FSME would be able to allocate the limited 
financial, human, technological, and marketing resources acquired through external social capital 
to develop quality relationships with customers and suppliers, while enhancing their ability to 
deal with competitors. Since top managers of firms exhibit different kinds of FSMEs, we expect 
those firms whose top managers have extensive FSME to achieve greater benefits. This is 
because they can leverage their extensive FSME and often tacit knowledge to mobilize 
complementary external resources and capabilities obtained through networking relationships. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: FSME will moderate the relationship between social capital from 
politicians and performance. The effect of social capital from politicians on performance 
will be positive when FSME is high rather than low. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: FSME will moderate the relationship between social capital from 
bureaucratic officials and performance. The effect of social capital from bureaucratic 
officials on performance will be stronger when FSME is high rather than low. 
 
Hypothesis 3c: FSME will moderate the relationship between social capital from 
community leaders and performance. The effect of social capital from community leaders 




The hypotheses were tested with data collected in 2002 and 2005 from senior executives (e.g., 
chief executive officers [CEOs]) and the chief financial officers of firms operating in Ghana. The 
sample is made up of the 200 largest companies selected from the 2001 edition of the Ghana 
Business Directory. Probability sampling techniques were not used in selecting the companies, 
but instead were focused on the 200 largest companies listed in the Ghana Business Directory. 
We contacted the CEOs of the selected companies to participate in the study in the latter part of 
2002. To ensure a high response rate and the provision of reliable and accurate responses, the 
CEOs were promised strict confidentiality about the respondents and company information. 
Several weeks after contacting the selected companies, one of the researchers personally visited 
the companies, gave the questionnaires to the CEOs, and agreed on a date to collect the 
completed questionnaires. After several visits to the companies, responses from 115 firms were 
received with 106 being useable for a response rate of 53%. In 2005, we collected follow-up data 
from the 106 firms using the same questionnaire survey that was administered in 2002 to 
ascertain the nature of social capital developed with external entities over time. All the firms 
completed the survey administered in 2005, but only 100 of the 106 firms provided complete 
responses to all the questionnaire items, for a response rate of 94%. Thus, the total observations 
collected in the two time periods are 206. 
 
In order to check for potential response bias and common method variance problems, the data 
were collected from individuals occupying senior management positions. On average, the 
respondents had worked for their companies for 12 years and had held their respective 
managerial positions for more than 9 years. We examined common method variance through two 
methods. First, information on external social capital were solicited for the 3-year periods of 
1998–2000 for data collected in 2002, and 2001–2003 for data collected in 2005, while 
information on performance was solicited for the following two-year periods: 2001–2002 for 
data collected in 2002 and 2004–2005 for data collected in 2005. Second, performance 
information was obtained from the heads of the accounting/finance function, while the 
independent variables were obtained from the CEOs/deputy CEOs. Third, a factor analysis of the 
items on the performance and social capital variables yielded six factors with eigenvalues greater 
than one, with the first factor accounting for about 20% of the variance. Thus, common method 




Firm performance was measured using two measures: return on assets (ROA) and return on sales 
(ROS). Self-reported performance data were collected from the head of the accounting/finance 
function in each organization. The respondents were asked to rate their organization's ROA and 
ROS relative to the major competitors in their industry for the 2-year periods of 2001–2002 and 
2004–2005. The performance items were measured on a scale ranging from 1 (much worse) to 7 
(much better). The use of perceptual measures of performance is common in situations where 
objective data are either not available or difficult to obtain because the firms are reluctant to 
provide such information (e.g., Amoako-Gyampah & Acquaah, 2008; Tan & Peng 2003), as in 
the situation in Ghana because only 12 of the organizations in the study are publicly traded 
companies. Moreover, the convergent, discriminant, and construct validities of using perceptual 
measures of performance as substitutes for objective measures have been demonstrated by Wall 
et al. (2004). We obtained objective measures of the dependent variables from the annual reports 
of the 12 companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange. The correlations between the objective 
measures and the subjective measures using the pooled data were as follows: ROA 
(r = 0.79, p < .001) and ROS (r = 0.86, p < .001). 
 
Our assessment of social capital was adapted from the work of Peng and Luo (2000) whose 
instrument has been used by several studies in transition economies (Li et al., 2008, 2009; Li & 
Zhang, 2007). Social capital was measured by assessing top managers' development and 
utilization of interpersonal and social relationships with (a) political leaders, (b) government 
bureaucratic officials, and (c) community leaders. The respondents were asked to assess the 
extent to which top managers have used personal and social networking relationships for the 3-
year periods of 1998–2000 and 2001–2003, respectively, on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (very 
little) to 7 (very extensive). The social capital measure for each of the three variables was 
operationalized by using the average responses to the items. Social capital from political 
leaders (α = .78) was operationalized using four items: relationship with city council politicians 
(mayor and council members), district council politicians (chief executive and members of 
district council assembly), regional government politicians, and national government politicians 
(e.g., ministers and parliamentarians). Social capital from bureaucratic officials (α = .83) was 
measured using two items: officials in regulatory and supporting institutions (e.g., Internal 
Revenue Service, the Central Bank, Environmental Protection Agency, etc.) and officials in 
investment and industrial institutions (e.g., Investment Board, Export Promotion Council, the 
Stock Exchange, etc.). Social capital from community leaders (α = .84) was measured using two 
items: relationship with local kings, chiefs, and/or their representatives and leaders of religious 
organizations (e.g., pastors, priests, traditional religious leaders, and imams). 
 
FSME is measured as the average top management tenure in a firm (i.e., the average number of 
years that top managers have spent in a particular firm). This variable is a proxy for the level of 
experience, expertise, and knowledge that is preserved at the top management of firms (Kor & 
Mahoney, 2005). 
 
We controlled for firm age, firm size, business sector, firm ownership, year dummy, and industry 
competition. Firm age was measured as the logarithm of the number of years since the formation 
or incorporation of the firm. Firm size was measured as the logarithm of the number of 
employees. Business sector was operationalized using a dummy variable, coded 1 for 
manufacturing firms and 0 for service firms. Firm ownership was measured as dummy variable, 
with wholly domestic-owned firms coded 1 and foreign-domestic joint venture firms coded 0. 
Because we pooled two periods of data, we included a dummy variable, Year dummy 2002, 
coded 1 for data collected in 2002 and 0 for data collected in 2005 to pick up any fixed effects 
that varied between the two periods. 
 
Industry competition (α = .76) was operationalized with six items. The respondents were asked to 
indicate the extent to which the following activities have taken place in their firm's industry 
within the 3-year periods of 1998–2000 and 2001–2003: (a) increase in the number of major 
competitors, (b) use of package deals for customers, (c) frequency of new product or service 
introductions, (d) the rate of change in price manipulations, (e) increase in the number of 
companies which have access to the same marketing channels, and (f) frequency of changes in 
government regulations affecting the industry (Mia & Clarke, 1999). These activities were 
measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very little) to 7 (very extensive). 
 
Reliability and Validity Analysis 
 
The reliability and validity of the measures were assessed by computing Cronbach alpha 
coefficients (α), content validity, and the use of factor analyses. The constructs, which have all 
been used in several past research studies, provide evidence of the validity of the scales (Anand 
& Ward, 2004). The reliability coefficients (α) of each measure are shown on the diagonal in 
Table 1. The α values range from .76 for industry competition to .84 for social capital from 
community leaders. All α values are greater than .70 and therefore indicate acceptable levels of 
reliability (Nunnaly & Bernstein, 1994). 
 
We used factor analyses to examine measurement convergent and discriminant validity. 
Convergent validity is typically considered to be satisfactory when items load high on their 
respective factors. All items had high loadings (greater than .40) on their respective factors, 
signifying desirable measurement convergent validity. Discriminant validity was assessed by 
examining whether each item loaded higher on the respective factor than on other constructs. 
The overall results indicated no cross-loadings, signifying that reasonable discriminant validity 




To establish causality, which is difficult in cross-sectional studies, a pooled time series and 
cross-section (TSCS) regression model with a time lag between the dependent and independent 
variables was used to examine how social capital, FSME, and the interaction between social 
capital and FSME affect firm performance (e.g., Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003). A pooled TSCS 
regression model was used because only two periods of data from 106 firms were available. The 
following model was estimated in a hierarchical manner: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 × 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 × 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 × 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
 
where Performance ιt is a subjective measure of ROA and ROS for firm i at time t = 1, 2. 
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Variables (N = 206) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Return on assets (ROA) 
           
2 Return on sales (ROS) .80 
          
3. Community .39 .44 .84 
        
4. Politicians .07 .15 .23 .78 
       
5. Bureaucrats .34 .42 .24 .32 .83 
      
6. Firm size a .13 .24 .23 .25 .23 
      
7. Business sector b −.19 −.13 −.17 −.34 −.16 −.23 
     
8. Firm ownership c .05 .13 .06 .05 .18 −.44 .06 
    
9. Industry competition .46 .43 .15 .03 .27 .03 −.11 .07 .76 
  
10. Firm age d .09 .20 .01 .15 .20 .48 −.14 −.33 .02 
  
11. Firm-specific managerial experience .30 .32 .22 .01 .15 .04 .05 .11 .13 .22 
 
Mean 4.67 4.77 4.83 3.97 4.74 1.97 0.83 0.51 4.88 1.29 9.18 
SD 1.38 1.35 1.19 1.34 1.29 0.48 0.38 0.50 1.32 0.29 5.49 
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.60 0.50 
Maximum 7.00 7.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 3.30 1.00 1.00 7.00 1.94 43.00 
Note. The values in diagonals are Cronbach alpha values (reliability coefficients). 
a Log of number of employees. 
b Manufacturing firms coded 1, service firms coded 0. 
c Firm ownership is a dummy variable coded 1 for wholly-owned domestic firms, and 0 for foreign–domestic joint venture (JV) firms. 
d Log of the number of years since formation or incorporation of firm. 
Significance levels: For r > .13, p < .05; r > .17, p < .01; and r > .23, p < .001. 
Note. a Coefficients are standardized coefficients (N = 206). 
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
  
TABLE 2. Results of Time Series Cross-section Analysis of the Relationship Between Social Capital, Firm-specific Managerial 
Experience, and Firm Performance a 
  Return on Assets (ROA) Return on Sales (ROS) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables β (t-value) β (t-value) β (t-value) β (t-value) β (t-value) β (t-value) 
Controls 
      
Firm age .028 (0.39) −.035 (−0.54) −.031 (−0.47) .117†(1.67) .063 (1.03) .055 (0.88) 
Firm size .094 (1.21) .084 (1.19) .098 (1.38) .177* (2.36) .132* (2.00) .143* (2.14) 
Business sector −.109†(−1.67) −.126* (−2.10) −.135* (−2.25) −.014 (−0.23) −.001 (−0.02) −.002 (−0.04) 
Firm ownership −.028 (−0.40) −.067 (−1.07) −.073 (−1.17) −.024 (−0.035) −.064 (−1.09) .063 (−1.06) 
Industry competition .448*** (7.16) .340*** (5.97) .382*** (6.58) .468*** (7.70) .343*** (6.46) .358*** (6.53) 
Year dummy for 2002 .029 (0.46) .094†(1.67) .120* (2.08) .045 (0.73) .097†(1.84) .101†(1.87) 
Social capital 
      
Politicians 
 
−.127* (−1.99) −.125* (−1.98) 
 
−.071 (−1.19) −.071 (−1.18) 
Bureaucratic officials 
 
.193** (3.00) .171** (2.69) 
 
.255*** (4.26) .247*** (4.09) 
Community leaders 
 
.181** (2.92) .177** (2.88) 
 
.231*** (4.01) .233*** (4.02) 
Management experience 
      
Firm-specific managerial experience 
 
.316*** (5.08) .374*** (5.38) 
 
.272*** (4.70) .281*** (4.28) 
Interactions 
      















Adjusted R 2 .217 .409 .463 .263 .488 .520 
Model F 10.44*** 15.17*** 12.76*** 13.15*** 20.51*** 15.99*** 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.906 1.869 1.752 2.082 1.910 1.906 
Note. a Coefficients are standardized coefficients (N = 206).  




Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables. It shows 
significant correlations among some of the variables, especially between firm size and firm 
ownership (r = −0.44). However, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the hypothesized 
variables were all less than 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem (Neter, Kutner, 
Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996). The validity of the econometric model was further examined 
through the use of several tests. The assumptions of equality of variance, independence of the 
error term, and normality of the residual were all met. Durbin–Watson statistics also indicated 
that autocorrelation is not a problem and thus the pooled TSCS model is adequate 
(Gujarati, 2003). Table 2 presents the standardized results of the pooled TSCS regression models 
examining hypotheses 1a through 3c. In models 1 and 4, we present the results for the control 
variables on ROA and ROS, respectively. The social capital and FSME variables are then added 
in models 2 and 5, respectively. The results from model 2 indicate that while social capital from 
bureaucratic officials and community leaders is significant and positively related to ROA 
(βBureaucratic = .193, p < .01; βCommunity = .181, p < .01), social capital from politicians is significant 
and negatively related to ROA (βPoliticians = −.127, p < .05). FSME is also significant and 
positively related to ROA (β = .316, p < .001). At the same time, the results from model 5 shows 
that social capital from bureaucratic officials and community leaders is significant and positively 
related to ROS (βBureaucratic = .255, p < .001; βCommunity = .231, p < .001), while social capital from 
politicians is negatively related to ROS (βPoliticians = −.071, p > .10), but it is not significant. Firm-
specific managerial experience is also significant and positively related to ROS 
(β = .272, p < .001). Thus, hypotheses 1b, 1c, and 2 are supported, while hypothesis 1a is 
partially supported for the effect of social capital from politicians on ROS. 
 
Models 3 and 6 show the results of the interaction analyses estimated to test hypotheses 3a, 3b 
and 3c, where centered values of social capital and FSME are used to create the interaction 
terms. Models 3 and 6 allow examinination of how top management FSME moderates the 
relationship between top management social capital from politicians, bureaucratic officials, 
community leaders, and ROA and ROS, respectively. The results from both models 3 and 6 
indicate that the interaction between social capital from politicians and firm-specific managerial 
experience, and social capital from community leaders and FSME were both positive and 
significantly related to ROA (βPoliticians×FSME = .193, p < .01; βCommunity×FSME = .169, p < .01), and 
ROS (βPoliticians×FSME = .105, p < .10; βCommunity×FSME = .153, p < .01). However, the interaction 
between social capital from bureaucratic officials and FSME is negative but not significantly 
related to both ROA and ROS. Thus, while hypotheses 3a and 3c are supported, hypothesis 3b is 
not supported. 
 
To gain more insight into these interaction effects, we follow Aiken and West (1991) and 
graphically plot the interactions depicted in models 3 and 6. These plots are shown in 
Figures 1 and 2, respectively. The plots in Figures 1 and 2 indicate that at high levels of FSME, 
firms gain more from the social capital from both politicians and community leaders. On the 
other hand, at low levels of FSME, the gain from social capital from these external constituents 
decreases. Integrating the direct effects of social capital from politicians, bureaucratic officials, 
and community leaders and the moderating effects of FSME on the social capital–performance 
relationships, the results suggest that social capital has a stronger effect on firm performance 
when FSME is high than when it is low. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 A. Moderating effects of firm-specific managerial experience on the relationship 
between social capital from politicians and return on asset. B. Moderating effects of firm-specific 
managerial experience on the relationship between social capital from community leaders and 
return on asset. 
 
 
FIGURE 2 A. Moderating effects of firm-specific managerial experience on the relationship 
between social capital from politicians and return on sales. B. Moderating effects of firm-specific 
managerial experience on the relationship between social capital from community leaders and 
return on sales. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study examined the impact of social capital developed from networking relationships with 
external entities, FSME, and the interaction between the two on firm performance. Specifically, 
our main hypotheses posited that the impact of social capitals from politicians, bureaucratic 
officials, and community leaders on firm performance would be stronger for firms whose top 
management has extensive FSME. It was also hypothesized that top management firm-specific 
managerial experience would be positively related to firm performance. These hypotheses were 
tested using survey data collected over two time periods from 106 firms from Ghana. 
 
Existing theoretical and empirical research in the social capital literature shows that social capital 
created from the networking relationship and ties with external parties function as conduits for 
the transmission of information, resources, and opportunities that could be leveraged to a firm's 
advantage and facilitate firm performance (e.g., Acquaah, 2007; Adler & Kwon, 2002, Li & 
Zhang, 2007; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Peng & Luo, 2000). The findings of the direct effects 
of social capital on performance from this study are consistent with extant research in transition 
economies (Acquaah, 2007; Acquaah & Eshun, 2010; Li et al., 2008, 2007; Peng & Luo, 2000). 
The findings show that the direct effect of social capital from networking relationships with 
community leaders positively influences firm performance. Thus social capital from networking 
relationships forged with community leaders provides firms with access to resources, 
information, learning, and knowledge that are used to minimize threats, exploit opportunities, 
and enhance performance in the formal institutional environment. 
 
The findings further indicate that social capital from networking relationships with government 
bureaucratic officials is beneficial to firms because it enables them to obtain the necessary 
resources to improve performance. However, the findings also show that the direct effect of 
social capital from networking relationships with politicians is detrimental to firm performance, 
although we hypothesized a neutral effect. The finding is, however, consistent with studies from 
transition economies (e.g., Li et al., 2009). The finding implies that there are indeed considerable 
costs to be incurred in cultivating relationships with politicians so as to obtain access to 
resources, information, contracts, etc., and these costs may adversely affect performance. In 
reconciling the outcomes from social capital from politicians and that from bureaucrats, it may 
be argued that the influence of networking with politicians on firm performance may be related 
to the fact that bureaucratic officials, and not politicians, implement most government policies. 
In Ghana, politicians make excessive demands for favors from firms with which they have 
established connections usually by stipulating a specific monetary contribution they must give to 
their political campaign and party, and also request that firms employ their relatives who may not 
have the necessary skills and expertise. Therefore, when top managers develop social capital 
from networking relationships with politicians, the benefits they expect to receive from such 
relationships in the form of resources (e.g., access to financial resources), opportunities (e.g., 
awarding of government projects or contracts, certification and approval of products as meeting 
standards, etc.), and/or information (e.g., new and impending regulations) may not fully 
materialize without building a stronger relationship with bureaucratic officials (Acquaah, 2007). 
 
Moreover, the findings show that extensive FSME is beneficial to firms. Top management with 
extensive firm-specific experience have accumulated tacit knowledge of their firm's idiosyncratic 
resources, capabilities, and strategic issues, in addition to the industry's opportunities and threats, 
and these experience-based capabilities allow the top managers to effectively and efficiently 
manage and deploy other resources and capabilities in their firms to enhance performance. 
 
In addition, the positive moderating effects of FSME on the relationship between social capitals 
from politicians and community leaders on firm performance suggest that the resources and 
capabilities obtained from social networking relationships are better managed and leveraged 
when managers possess extensive firm-specific experience and knowledge. In fact, the positive 
influence of the interaction between social capital from politicians and FSME on performance 
suggests that extensive FSME attenuates the negative effect of social capital from politicians on 
performance. Thus, FSME is crucial in enabling firms in transition economies to be selective in 
establishing networking relationships to obtain the required resources, capabilities, and 
information that are used to exploit market opportunities and enhance firm performance. 
 
The importance of the crucial role of FSME in effectively managing the resources and 
capabilities obtained from social capital can be observed in Figures 1 and 2. While the direct 
effect of social capital from politicians is negative, Figures 1 and 2 indicate that it is only so for 
firms whose top management does not have extensive firm-specific experience. Moreover, while 
the direct effect of social capital from community leaders positively influences firm 
performance, Figures 1 and 2 show that it is only true for firms whose top management have 
extensive firm-specific experience. The results thus demonstrate that although social capital 
derived from external entities contribute to firm success in transition economies, top managers' 
role in leveraging their capabilities to deploy the resources and capabilities obtained from the 
social relationships is even more important. These findings corroborate the RBV that top 
managers' experience-based capabilities are important in deploying and transforming other 
resources and capabilities to create value (Kor, 2003; Kor & Mahoney, 2005; Penrose, 1995). 
 
Overall, the results provide some managerial insights for firms in Ghana in particular and in 
other transition economies in general. The findings imply that there are significant benefits to 
firms from the social capital created from networking relationships with government bureaucrats 
and community leaders, but managers should be cautious about their interpersonal and social 
networking relationships with politicians. Top managers should also recognize that FSME plays 
a vital role in cultivating meaningful networking relationships with external stakeholders to 
develop social capital and benefiting from such relationships. Even though firms who forged 
social networking relationships with politicians do not seem to benefit from the social capital so 
developed, it only applies to those firms with limited top management firm-specific experiential 
knowledge. In fact, in a transition economy like Ghana where the government's economic 
policies are transforming the economy into a market-based economy albeit high levels of 
institutional voids, the development and utilization of market-related managerial capabilities are 
crucial in exploiting opportunities in the business environment. As noted, a market-based 
capability such as FSME and knowledge was the difference between firms that benefited from 
social capital from politicians and those that did not. Extensive FSME enables a firm to be 
selective in cultivating social capital from politicians to obtain the necessary resources for the 
strategic organization of activities. 
 
The findings should be interpreted within the limitations of the study. First, we used subjective 
measures of performance instead of objective measures. Objective performance measures would 
have been preferable but only 12 firms were publicly owned so objective performance 
information was difficult to obtain for all the firms. Even if such performance data were provided 
by the firms, they may suffer from inaccuracies, as such data are often not audited in privately 
held organizations. Moreover, Wall et al. (2004) demonstrated the validity of subjective 
performance measures as substitutes for objective performance measures. Second, we measure 
FSME as the average tenure with a particular firm. This is only one of the measures of the 
managerial resource construct and thus a limitation of the study. Future research could explore 
other measures of the managerial resource construct such as top management knowledge base, 
firm-specific industry experience, and/or top management educational 
background/qualifications. Moreover, this study could be replicated in other African countries to 
ascertain the applicability of the findings. 
 
In conclusion, this study informs this fascinating area of research by showing that the 
development of social capital from networking relationships with external entities, possession of 
FSME, and their interactions have a complex impact on performance for firms in Ghana. Future 
research should examine these relationships in other transition economies so as to deepen our 
understanding of the impact of social capital from networking relationships and FSME on 
performance and thus help in providing us with rich insights into social networking theory and 
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